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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Criminal Law-Presentence Investigation-Right of Confrontation
In every criminal prosecution the accused enjoys the constitu-
tional right to be present at his trial.' State v. Pope2 presented for
the first time in North Carolina the question of whether this right
extends to a presentence investigation.' After the defendant had
been found guilty of felonious breaking and entering and of larceny,
but prior to sentencing, the trial judge, in the company of the
solicitor, the deputy clerk, and two state's witnesses, retired to cham-
bers to clerically compile the counts in the indictment. Neither the
defendant nor his counsel was present at this conference. Here, in-
formation was elicited for the first time which tended to implicate
the defendant in the commission of other crimes for which no war-
rants had been issued. Before pronouncing sentence, the judge con-
fronted the defendant with this information and gave hiin an oppor-
tunity to refute or explain it. The defendant declined to comment,
but on appeal from a denial of his motion to set aside the judgment
and vacate the sentence, he contended that his exclusion from the
presentence investigation amounted to a violation of his fundamental
rights and a denial of due process of law. The North Carolina
Supreme Court rejected these contentions4 and affirmed the lower
court conviction. They warned, however, that all information
coming to the notice of the trial court which might conceivably aggra-
1 "In all criminal prosecutions, every person charged with crime has the
right to be informed of the accusation and to confront the accusers and wit-
nesses with other testimony . " N.C. CoNsT. art. 1, § 11. "This, of course,
implies that he shall have the right to be present." State v. Overton, 77
N.C. 485, 486 (1887).
257 N.C. 326, 126 S.E.2d 126 (1962).
' When a defendant is convicted of a crime, the punishment for which is
left, within certain defined limits, to the discretion of the judge, an investiga-
tion may be conducted with regard to any circumstances which tend to
aggravate or mitigate the punishment. The investigation may be conducted
by the judge himself, or consist merely of the submission of a presentence
report prepared by a probation officer. N.C. Gir. STAT. § 15-198 (1953),
State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326, 335, 126 S.E.2d 126, 133 (1962). See also
State v, Barbour, 243 N.C. 265, 90 S.E.2d 388 (1955), and State v. Summers,
98 N.C. 702, 4 S.E. 120 (1887). See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R. 1211
.(1932-).
.. The court noted the distinction between the trial and sentencing stages
of the proceedings, recognizing that whereas the issue of guilt or innocence
in the former demands the defendant's presence at all times to confront his
acqusers, the same reason does not prevail, in the latter. 257 N.C. at 333,
126 S.E.2d at 132.
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vate the punishment should be .disclosed to the defendant, with an
opportunity afforded to refute or explain it.'
Although the subject of the defendant's right to be present at a
presentence investigation has received little judicial attention, those
courts which have directly decided the question are not in agreement.
Some states have judicially extended the defendant's right to be
present at the trial to a presentence investigation,' while other states
have failed to recognize such a right.' Notwithstanding dictum to
the contrary,8 the federal courts have generally denied the defendant a
right to be present at this time.9 Those courts which demand the
defendant's presence rely mainly on constitutional grounds, 10 al-
though one court suggests the defendant's common-law right to be
present when sentence is pronounced as a possible basis for such a
rule." On the other hand, the opposing view, possibly in deference
s Id. at 335, 126 S.E.2d at 132.
'In the Matter of Fowler, 49 Mich. 234, 13 N.W. 530 (1882); State v.
Simms, 131 S.C. 422, 127 S.E. 840 (1925); State v. Harvey, 128 S.C.
447, 123 S.E. 201 (1924); Phelps v. State, 158 Tex. Crim. 510, 257 S.W.2d
302 (1953); State v. Stevenson, 64 W. Va. 392, 62 S.E. 688 (1908). Note
that in West Virginia, the right to be "personally present during the trial"
is reserved by statute rather than by the constitution. W. VA. CoDE AN1N.
§ 6191 (1961). This statute has been construed as requiring the defendant's
presence "when any step affecting him is taken from arraignment to final
judgment inclusive." State v. Vance, 124 S.E.2d 252, 259 (W. Va. 1962).
(Emphasis added.)
7Driver v. State, 201 Md. 25, 92 A.2d 570 (1952); Commonwealth v.
Myers, 193 Pa. Super. 531, 165 A.2d 400 (1960). See also Commonwealth
v. Johnson, 348 Pa. 349, 35 A.2d 312 (1944), where the Pennsylvania court
reversed a judgment in which the record failed to disclose that no ex parte
evidence was heard by a three judge court sitting en banc to determine
the degree of guilt. The court stresses the fact that they are not reversing
because ex parte evidence might have been heard in the determination of
sentence.
8 "We think, however, that such information should have been disclosed
to the judge in open court and in the presence of the appellant." Stephan v.
United States, 133 F.2d 87, 100 (6th Cir. 1943).
- Zeff v. Sanford, 31 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ga. 1940).
2' These courts have held that since a defendant has a right to have
everything bearing on his case open and above board, State v. Harvey; 128
S.C. 447, 123 S.E. 201 (1924), it would be clearly unconstitutional to permit
evidence to be introduced and considered in the absence' of a convicted
defendant, In the Matter of Fowler, 49 Mich. 234, 13 N.'W. 530 (1882).
"Our system of jurisprudence is based on the doctrine of confrontation. An
accused is not confronted by witnesses who speak in his absence." Phelps v.
State, 158 Tex. Crim. 510, 512, 257 S.W.2d 302, 303 (1953).
. The fontana court in construing their statutory presentence procedure,
note 13 infra, finds support for demanding the defendant's, presence in the
sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. Kuhl v. District Court,
366 P.2d 347, 362 (Mont. 1961).
11 "One of the purposes of requiring that the defeiidaht be present may
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to administrative convenience, favors limiting the right to be present
solely to that period in' which the alleged guilt of the defendant is
determined. 2
Statutory provisions in nine states provide that all information
in aggravation or mitigation of punishment must be presented in
open court."3 At least two states have construed these statutes as
also requiring the defendant's presence.' 4
In reaching its conclusion in the principal case, the court recog-
nized that the modem philosophy of fitting the punishment to -the
offender rather than the crime,' 5 demands that a sentencing judge
not be restricted to the formalistic requirements of trial procedure
in gathering information to assist him in determining an appropriate
sentence.' 6 While it may be conceded that the practice of individual-
izing punishment is commendable, it nevertheless may be argued that
the means employed to achieve this goal are frequently open to
criticism. The rationale employed to deny the defendant a right
vell be to give him an opportunity to show that accusations made against
him, other than the one of which he stands convicted, are without foundation,
and a chance to object to the consideration of improper evidence." People
y. Giles, 70 Cal. App. 2d 872, -, 161 P.2d 623, 628 (1945). This argu-
ment is supported by no authority. For a statement of the reason for the
common-law rule, see Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118, 131 (1891).
" Thus, the right to be present is limited to that period between arraign-
ment and verdict. Commonwealth v. Myers, 193 Pa. Super. 531, 540, 165
A.2d 400, 405 (1960). Compare this with the West Virginia interpretation
of its statutory provision requiring the defendant's presence at the trial, supra
note 6. Those courts which refuse to extend the right to a presentence
investigation nevertheless insist that "the manifestly correct practice . . .
is-to hear all the testimony in the case, including the testimony which relates
to the fixing of the penalty, in the presence of the defendant and his
counsel . . . ." Commonwealth v. Johnson, 348 Pa. 349, 355, 35 A.2d 312,
314-15 (1944).
8 ARIz. CRIM. RULES § 336; CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1203, 1204; IDAHO CODE
§19-2516 (1948); MINN. STAT. §631.20 (1947); MONT. REV. STAT.
§§ 94-7813, 7814 (1949); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 29-26-18 (1960); OKLA.
STAT. § 974 (1958) ; ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 137.080, 137.090 (1959) ; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-35-13 (1953).
"People v. Giles, 70 Cal. App. 2d 872, 161 P.2d 623 (1945); People
v. Sauer, 67 Cal. App. 2d 664, 155 P.2d 55 (1945); Kuhl v. District Court,
366 P.2d 347 (Mont. 1961), in which the reception of information offered
by a probation officer in the absence of the defendant constituted a violation
of the Montana statute.
In courts-martial trials, evidence bearing on the subject of punishment
is heard immediately after a plea or verdict of guilty. MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL UNITED STATES § 75 & app. 8 (1951). This implies the defendant's
presence.
'
5 Weihofen, Retribution Is Obsolete, 39 NAT. PROB. & PAR. Assoc. NEWS
1 (1960).
I 257 N.C. at 333, 126 S.E.2d at 133.
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to be present at the presentence investigation 7 fails to take into
account the fact that in many criminal cases, the paramount interest
in the proceeding is not the guilt or innocence of the accused, but
rather the type and amount of punishment to be inflicted."8 In North
Carolina, the trial judge, for purposes of sentencing, may avail him-
self of information concerning every facet of the defendant's back-
ground.'9 If the defendant's liberty is to be deprived on the basis
of such information, justice requires that the information be ac-
curate.20 One method of promoting accuracy is to confront the
defendant with such information and give him an opportunity to
rebut it. 21 The principal case purports to insure such safeguards,
22
yet, in effect, reposes the defendant's protection in the discretion of
the trial judge.23  Although a sentence based on false information
concerning the defendant's background is vitiated under due process
standards,24 such a holding is of little comfort to a defendant
' See note 4 supra.A study made in 1956 of 32 superior courts in North Carolina revealed
that 47.7% of all felony cases were disposed of by pleas of guilty. Hall,
The Administration of Criminal Justice in North Carolina, 1956 (unpublished
research in N. C. Inst. Govt. Library). "About ninety percent of all de-
fendants in federal courts plead guilty." Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Free-
dom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1290 (1952). See generally
ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 546 (1947) and
Note, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 702, 706 (1958).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-198 (1953) provides for furnishing the court
with a probation report concerning the criminal record, social history, and
present condition of the defendant. "The investigation may adduce informa-
tion concerning defendant's criminal record, if any, his moral character,
standing in the community, habits, occupation, social life, responsibilities,
education, mental and physical health, the specific charge against him, and
other matter pertinent to a proper judgment." 257 N.C. at 335, 126 S.E.2d
at 133.: ,Wyzanski, supra note 18, at 1291.
" "Anglo-American law has relied traditionally upon an adversary system
to ascertain the facts. Impartiality has not been considered a sufficient safe-
guard." Knowlton, Should Presentence Reports Be Shown to a Defendant,
79 N.J.L.J. 409, 417 (1956).
"* The court instructed judges to disclose all information coming to their
notice which might conceivably aggravate the punishment, and afford the
defendant an opportunity to refute or explain such information. 257 N.C.
at 335, 126 S.E.2d at 133.
" In order for the defendant to know the contents of probation reports
and other oral testimony, it is obvious from this holding that such knowledge
will be dependent on the trial judge's decision whether to disclose or conceal
the information. "Certainly due process should not depend on the un-
restrained discretion of one man in determining whether the information
considered should be disclosed." Note, 34 MINN. L. REv. 470, 472-73 (1950).
" Ex parte Hoopsick, 172 Pa. Super. 12, 91 A.2d 241 (1952). See also
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948), and Smith v. United States, 223
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sentenced on the basis of false information if the trial judge in-
advertently fails to disclose such information to the defendant before
sentencing.
The procedural problem at the sentencing stage is characterized,
on the one hand, by a desire to grant the sentencing judge the utmost
leeway in access to information properly bearing on the question of
punishment, and, on the other, by the necessity that the defendant
be confronted with such information to insure its accuracy. Al-
though the principal case dealt primarily with the propriety of re-
ceiving oral testimony in the defendant's absence, the problem fre-
quently arises with regard to a written report considered by the
judge prior to sentencing. In Williams v. New York2" the United
States Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment is not violated when the defendant is denied
the opportunity to confront and cross-examine informants who con-
tribute to a probation report considered by the judge before
sentencing.2" Perhaps the more serious question is whether the
defendant should be allowed to examine the report itself and chal-
F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1955). Townsend appears to have been determined
largely on the ground that the defendant was not represented by counsel
When sentence was imposed. However, one writer has questioned the
benefit of counsel in a situation in which the judge fails to disclose the
false premises on which he bases his stentence. Note, Due Process and
Legislative Standards in Sentencing, 101 U. PA. L. Rxv. 257, 267 (1952).
25337 U.S. 241 (1949), portions of which are quoted in Pope in support
of the court's holding that the instant procedure was not in violation of the
due process clause of the North Carolina Constitution, art. 1, § 17. 257 N.C.
at 332-34, 126 S.E.2d at 131-32.
2" Mr. Justice Black reasoned that "most of the information now relied
upon by judges to guide them in the intelligent imposition of sentence would
be unavailable if information were restricted to that given in open court by
witnesses subject to cross-examination." 337 U.S. at 250. But see Jay v.
Boyd, 351 U.S.'345 (1956), in which Mr. Justice Black in a dissenting opinion
vigorously objects on due process grounds to the Attorney General's use of
confidential information as a basis for refusing to suspend deportation of a
former Communist.
A closely analagous situation is the procedure by which the sanity of
a convicted murderer is determined subsequent to sentence but prior to
execution. In Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950), the Supreme Court
over due process objections approved a procedure in which the defendant
was denied an opportunity to present his own evidence or confront the
evidence submitted by the state on the issue of sanity. In a dissent, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter addressed himself to the majority's argument that
such a procedure was necessary to obviate delay: "[T]he risk of an undue
delay is hardly comparable to the grim risk of the barbarous execution of an
insane man because of a hurried, one-sided, untested determination of the
question of insanity." 339 U.S. at 25. The decision in this case was ap-
proved in Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549 (1958).
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lenge its accuracy.17  Statutes in at-least three states expressly pro-
vide for such inspection by the defendant.2" The originally proposed
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure included a provision2 9 which
would have insured inspection of a probation report by the defendant.
This provision was deleted in the final draft,3 ° however, and the
practice now varies between making the report public in some dis-
tricts, and treating it as confidential in others.3 ' Arguments against
a procedure of inspection stress the possibility that such a procedure
would seriously hamper the efficient administration of criminal
justice, and possibly result in a retrial of collateral issues.32 It seems
just as probable, however, that if the report is true, it will not be
contested at all, either because it is not detrimental to the defendant,
or because it is capable of comparatively easy proof, as in the case of
establishing the fact of a prior conviction. Conversely, those por-
tions of the report which are challenged are likely to be statements
which are most prejudicial to the defendant and more difficult to
It is questionable whether Williams decided this issue. Note, 23 So.
CAL. L. REv. 105, 107 (1949). For a statement of the narrow holding in
Williams, see Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407, 412 n. 4 (1954), and
White v. United States, 215 F.2d 782, 789 (1954).2 ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 42, § 23 (1959); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203 (Supp.
1962); VA. CODE § 53-278.1 (1958). See Linton v. Commonwealth, 192
Va. 437, 65 S.E.2d 534 (1951) where the failure to allow defense counsel
to cross-examine the probation officer was reversible error. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15-207 (1953) provides that the probation report is privileged in-
formation and may only be seen by the court and "others entitled under this
article." One writer has interpreted this to include disclosure to the de-
4fendant and his counsel. Sharp, The Confidential Nature of Presentence
Reports, 5 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 127, 131 (1955). In the absence of case
authority to substantiate either position, it seems reasonable to argue that
the section does not make disclosure to the defendant mandatory.
" "After determination of the question of guilt the report shall be made
available, upon such conditions as the court may impose, to the attorney for
the parties and to such other persons as the court may designate." FED. R.
CRIM. P., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE 34 (1944).
"o See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c).
" "[I]n 65 districts the presentence report is available only to the judge.
In 30 districts the report is available also to other interested parties and in
all but two of these the United States Attorney receives a copy. In 11 dis-
tricts the defense counsel has access to the report." Pilot Institute On
Sentencing, 26 F.R.D. 231, 329 (1961). See generally Chandler, Latter-Day
Procedures In the Sentencing and Treatment of Offenders in the Federal
Courts, 37 VA. L. REV. 825, 834 (1951).
"Morgan v. State, 142 So. 2d 308, 312 (Fla. 1962). The rules of evi-
dence in the California presentence procedure appear to be rather rigid.
People v. Valdivia, 5 Cal. Rptr. 832, 182 Cal. App. 2d 149 (1960), 34 So.
CAL. L. REv. 231 (1961) ; People v. Neal, 97 Cal. App. 2d 688, 218 P.2d 556(1950).
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prove, such as conclusions deduced from hearsay or rumor.3 3 The
risk of injustice to the defendant if such statements are false would
seem to outweigh contrary considerations of administrative con-
venience.3
4
A further argument against allowing disclosure and challenge
is that such a rule might discourage confidential informants, thus
rendering unavailable much of the information now relied upon by
judges.3 " This possibility is conceded, although it would seem to be
an unavoidable consequence of any system of criminal administration
which requires that defendants be informed of the evidence against
them."
Judging from the tenor of opinions which deny the defendant
access to probation reports and the right to be present when oral
testimony is presented, the inescapable conclusion is that, but for in-
superable procedural difficulties, the courts think it only fair that
there be some means by which a defendant may be confronted with
information bearing on the subject of punishment.8 7
The English courts seem to have reached a flexible solution.
An act of Parliament38 provides that after conviction "without
prejudice to any right of the accused to tender evidence as to his
"' "The presentence probation report in Williams v. New York illustrates
this problem. The probation department there concluded that Williams was
a 'psychopathic liar' whose ideas 'revolve around a morbid sexuality,' that
he was 'a full time burglar,' 'emotionally unstable,' 'suffers no remorse,' and
was deemed to be 'a menace to society.'" His criminal record consisted of a
charge of theft when he was 11 years old and a conviction as a wayward
minor. Such a record would not support such generalizations as above. The
conclusions were drawn from information solicited from various people who
accused Williams of committing other crimes for which he had never
been prosecuted. Note, Due Process and Legislative Standards in Sentencing,
101 U. PA. L. REv. 257, 276-77 (1952). On conclusions of probation officers
based on these uncorroborated accusations, the trial judge overrode the jury's
recommendation of life imprisonment and imposed the death penalty on
Williams, a convicted murderer.
8" Rubin, Probation and Due Process of Law, 31 Focus 40, 44 (1952);
Note, Right of Criminal Offenders To Challenge Reports Used In Deter-
mining Sentence, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 567, 571-72 (1949).
8 United States v. Durham, 181 F. Supp. 503, 504 (D.D.C.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 854 (1960).
"Rubin, op. cit. supra note 34, at 45.
See Zeff v. Sanford, 31 F. Supp. 736, 738 (N.D. Ga. 1940) ; Driver v.
State, 201 Md. 25, 32, 92 A.2d 570, 573 (1952) ; Commonwealth v. Johnson,
348 Pa. 349, 355, 35 A.2d 312, 314-15 (1944). The court in the principal
case admits that it is better practice to receive all reports and representations
from probation officers in open court. State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326, 335, 126
S.E.2d 126, 133 (1962).
"
8 Prevention of Crime Act, 1908 8 Edw. VIII, ch. 59 § 10(5).
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character and repute, evidence of character and repute n-iay, if the
court thinks it fit, be admitted as evidence bearing on the question
whether the accused is or is not leading persistently a dishonest or
criminal life." If the accused challenges any statement, the judge has
two alternatives. He must either disregard the challenged state-
nient,89 or require legal proof of it.4" Such a procedure accom-
modates both interests by allowing the judge to consider all un-
challenged information, while at the same time insuring its accuracy
by requiring proof of those statements which are challenged.
While the decision in the Pope case worked no obvious injustice
on the particular defendant, its limited protection to defendants in
general should provoke serious legislative attention to the possible
adoption of a statutory presentence procedure. This procedurej while
reserving the necessary discretion in the sentencing judge, should be
geared to insure the utmost accuracy of any information, oral or
written, which is offered in aggravation or mitigation of punishment.
New concepts of administering sentences should not neglect the
protection of the individual they seek to benefit.
WILLIAM E. SHINN, JR.
Estoppel by Judgment-Client Not Estopped in Action.
Against Attorney
A resident of Virginia and his wife engaged a North Carolina
attorney to defend them in an action brought against them in North
Carolina. The attorney failed to file any pleadings and a default
judgment was entered against his clients. Subsequently, they em-
ployed other counsel and moved to set aside the default judgment on
the ground of excusable neglect.1 The attorney also retained counsel
and joined in the prosecution of the motion. The court found that
the neglect of the attorney was not attributable to his clients,2 but
" Rex v. Campbell, 6 Crim. App. R. 131, 132 (1911).
40 Ibid.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-220 (1953) provides: "The judge shall, upon such
terms as may be just, at any time within one year after notice thereof, relieve
a party from a judgment ... taken against him through his mistake ... or
excusable neglect . .. ."
If a party has employed counsel and given him the necessary informa-
tion about the case, the attorney agreeing to file an answer and protect his
interest, failure of the attorney to perform his duty is excusable neglect on
the part of the client. Gunter v. Dowdy, 224 N.C. 522, 31 S.E.2d 524 (1944) ;
Edwards v. Butler, 186 N.C. 200, 119 S.E. 7 (1923) ; Mann v. Hall, 163 N.C.
50, 79 S.E. 437 (1913).
